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Abstract
The analysis of games played on graph-like structures is of increasing importance due to the
prevalence of social networks, both virtual and physical, in our daily life. As well as being relevant
in computer science, mathematical analysis and computer simulations of such distributed games are
vital methodologies in economics, politics and epidemiology, amongst other fields. Our contribution
is to give compositional semantics of a family of such games as a well-behaved mapping, a strict
monoidal functor, from a category of open graphs (syntax) to a category of open games (semantics).
As well as introducing the theoretical framework, we identify some applications of compositionality.
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1 Introduction
Compositionality concerns finding homomorphic mappings
Syntax→ Semantics. (1)
This concept, of foundational importance in computer science, originated in formal logic [21,
22], and is at the centre of formal semantics of programming languages [24]. In recent years,
there have been several 2-dimensional examples [6, 4, 1] of the approach, where both Syntax
and Semantics are symmetric monoidal categories. Usually Syntax is freely generated
from a (monoidal) signature, possibly modulo some equations. This opens up the possibility
of recursive definitions and proofs by structural induction, familiar from our experience with
ordinary, 1-dimensional syntax.
In this paper, we consider an instance of (1) that is—at first sight—radically different from
the usual concerns of programming and logic: network games [5]. Network games involve a
number of agents who play concurrently, and share information with other players based
on some underlying, ambient network topology. Indeed, the utility of each player typically
depends on the structure of the network. An obvious application area is social networks [10],
but such games are also studied in economics [11], politics [23] and epidemiology [15], amongst
other fields.
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2 Games on graphs: a compositional approach
In formal accounts of network games, graphs play the role of network topologies. Players are
identified with graph vertices, and their utility is influenced only by their choices and those of
their immediate neighbours. Network games are thus “games on graphs”. A simple example
is the majority game: players “win” when they make the same choice as the majority of their
neighbours.
In what way do such games fit into the conceptual framework of (1)? Our main contribution
is the framing of certain network games as monoidal functors from a suitable category [7] of
open graphs Grph, which is our Syntax, to the category [12] of open games Game, which
is our Semantics. That is, given a network game specification N (e.g. the majority game),
such games are functors
FN : Grph→ Game (2)
that in particular, for any closed graph Γ ∈ Grph, yield the game FN (Γ), which is the
game N played on Γ. However, compositionality means that such games are actually “glued
together” from simpler, open games. In fact, FN maps each vertex of Γ to an open game
called the utility-maximising player, and the connectivity of Γ is mapped, following the rules
of N , to structure in Game.
Our contribution thus makes the intuitively obvious idea that the data of network games
is dependent on their network topology precise. Concrete descriptions of network games,
given a fixed topology, are often quite involved: our approach means that they can be
derived in a principled way from basic building blocks. In some cases, the compositional
description can also help in the mathematical analysis of games. For example, in the case
of the majority game, the right decomposition of a network topology Γ as an expression
in Grph can yield a recipe for the Nash equilibrium of FN (Γ) in Game in terms of the
equilibria of the open games obtained via FN from the open graphs in the decomposition.
While a compositional analysis of equilibria is not always possible, we argue compositional
reasoning can, nevertheless, be a valuable weapon in the modelling arsenal.
Technically, we proceed as follows. We introduce a novel game called monoid network
game (Definition 7) that generalises all of our motivating examples. Roughly speaking,
monoid network games are parametrised wrt (i) a monoid that aggregates information from
neighbours and (ii) functions that govern how that information is propagated in the network.
Our category of open graphs Grph (Definition 17) is an extension of the approach developed
in [7], from undirected graphs to undirected multigraphs. Our Grph is different from other
notions of “open graph” in the literature, e.g. via cospans [9]. Indeed, our approach is centred
around the use of adjacency matrices, which are commonly used in graph theory to encode
connectivity. The emphasis on the matrix algebra means that Grph has the structure of
commutative bialgebra—equivalent to the algebra of ordinary N matrices [14, 25]—but also
additional structure that captures the algebraic content of adjacency matrices. Given that
Grph has a presentation in terms of generators and equations, to obtain (2) it suffices to
define it on the generators and check that Grph-equations are respected in Game. This is
our main result, Theorem 26.
In addition to the presentation of Grph in terms of generators and equations, we characterise
it as a more concrete category A (Theorem 22) which makes its status as the category of
open graphs more apparent. The result can be understood as a kind of normal form for the
morphisms of Grph, which is useful to describe concrete instantiations of FN for arbitrary
open graphs (Theorem 28).
Our work is a first step towards a more principled way of defining games parametrised by
graphs. Future work will extend both the notions of graphs (e.g. by considering directed
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graphs), as well as the kinds of games played on them. While we do identify some applications,
we believe that compositional reasoning is severely under-rated in traditional game theory,
and that its adoption will lead to both more flexible modelling frameworks, as well as more
scalable mathematical analyses.
Structure of the paper.
We introduce our network game running examples in §2 and unify them under under the
umbrella of monoid network games. Next, we recall the basics of open games in §3 and
identify the building blocks needed for (2). In §4 we introduce the category Grph of open,
undirected multigraphs, and give a combinatorial characterisation account, which is useful in
applications. The construction of FN is in §5, and several applications of our compositional
framework are given in §6.
2 Games on graphs
In this section we introduce motivating examples for our compositional framework and
introduce the a novel notion of game called the monoid network game that unifies them.
Network games [13] are parametric wrt a particular network topology, usually represented by
a graph. Players correspond to the vertices, and each player’s payoff is affected only by the
choices of its immediate neighbours: those players that are connected via an edge. In this
sense, network games are games played on graphs. Undirected multigraphs are expressive
enough for our purposes.
I Definition 1. An undirected multigraph is a tuple G = (VG, EG), where VG is the set
of vertices and EG is a symmetric multi-relation on VG: a function EG : VG × VG → N st
EG(vi, vj) = EG(vj , vi).
Another, common way of capturing the connectivity of a graph is via adjacency matrices,
which often play an important role in graph theory. They are also crucial for our compositional
account.
I Definition 2. Assuming an ordering on the set of vertices of a graph, square matrices A
with entries from N can record connections between vertex i and j in Aij : a 0-entry signifies
no edge between i and j, and non-zero entries count the connections. Ordinary matrices are
too concrete to uniquely represent connectivity since edges between i and j can be recorded
in the (i, j)th entry or the (j, i)th entry. One could use symmetric matrices or triangular
matrices. For us, it is better to equate matrices that encode the same connectivity: A ∼ A′ iff
A+AT = A′ +A′T . We will refer to equivalence classes [A] as adjacency matrices. A finite
undirected multigraph can then be defined, equivalently, as a pair (kG, [A]) where kG ∈ N and
[A] is a kG × kG adjacency matrix win N entries.
Let G(n) be the set of undirected multigraphs with n vertices, enumerated as v1, . . . , vn.
I Definition 3 (Network game). An n-player network game N consists of, for each player
1 ≤ i ≤ n, a set of choices Xi and a payoff ui : G(n)×
∏n
j=1Xj → R, st for each G ∈ G(n),
ui(G, x) = ui(G, x′)
whenever xi = x′i and xj = x′j for all (vi, vj) ∈ EG: each player’s payoff is affected only by
its neighbours. The set of strategies is
∏n
i=1Xi and its elements x ∈
∏n
i=1Xi are strategy
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profiles.
The best response, for a graph G ∈ G(n), is a relation BN on the set of strategies, defined by
(x, x′) ∈ BN ⇔ ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n. ∀yi ∈ Xi. ui(G, x[i 7→ x′i]) ≥ ui(G, x[i 7→ yi])
A Nash equilibrium, for a graph G ∈ G(n), is a strategy profile x s.t. for each player
1 ≤ i ≤ n,
ui(G, x) ≥ ui(G, x[i 7→ x′i])
for each possible alternative x′i ∈ Xi. This is a fix-point of the best response relation.
We now recall three important examples of network games.
I Example 4 (Majority game). Each player has two choices, Xi = {Y,N}. A player receives
a utility of 1 if its choice is the majority choice among its neighbours in the graph, and 0
otherwise, i.e.
ui(G, x) =
{
1 if |{vj | (vi, vj) ∈ EG and xi = xj}| ≥ |{vj | (vi, vj) ∈ EG and xi 6= xj}|
0 otherwise.
The Nash equilibria are strategy profiles where each player takes the majority choice of its
neighbours.
I Example 5 (Best-shot public goods game). Each player has two choices, Xi = {Y,N},
interpreted as investing or not investing in a public good. The investment has a cost 0 < c < 1
to the player who invests, and gives a utility of 1 to the investor and every neighbour. We can
imagine that players are already partially satisfied with the current situation and assign a
utility of 1− c+ , with 0 <  < c, to the situation where neither the player nor its neighbours
invest. The utility functions thus are:
ui(G, x) =

1− c if xi = Y
1 if xi = N and xj = Y for some (vi, vj) ∈ EG
1− c+  otherwise.
The Nash equilibrium is when no player invests, an example of a ‘tragedy of the commons’.
I Example 6 (Weakest-link public goods game). Each player’s choice is an investment, valued
in R+. Investment have a cost to the player given by an increasing cost function c : R+ → R+
where c(0) = 0, and the utility is given by the minimum level of investment of the player
and all neighbours:
ui(G, x) = min
j=i or (vi,vj)∈EG
xj − c(xi).
A necessary condition for a Nash equilibrium is that no player invests more than any of its
neighbours.
In Examples 4, 5 and 6 every player has the same set of choices, and the utility depends
in a uniform way on neighbours’ choices. We collect these examples under the umbrella
of monoid network games. To the best of our knowledge, the following definition has not
previously appeared in the literature.
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I Definition 7 (Monoid network game). A monoid network game is a tuple N = (X,M, f, g)
where:
X is the set of choices for each player
M = (M,⊕, e) is a commutative monoid
f : X →M and g : X×M → R are functions such that each utility function has the form
ui(G, x) = g
xi, ⊕
(vi,vj)∈EG
f(xj)
 .
Examples 4, 5, 6 are indeed examples of monoid network games:
The majority game (Example 4) has the monoid (N,+, 0) × (N,+, 0), counting the
Y and N ‘votes’. Define f : {Y,N} → N2 by f(Y ) = (1, 0) and f(N) = (0, 1), and
g : {Y,N} × N2 → R is:
g(x, (n1, n2)) =

1 if x = Y and n1 ≥ n2
1 if x = N and n1 ≤ n2
0 otherwise.
The best-shot public goods game (Example 5) is a monoid network game with the
monoid Bool = ({Y,N},∨, N), where ∨ is logical or, f : Bool → Bool is the identity,
and g : Bool×Bool→ R:
g(x, y) =

1− c if x = Y
1 if x = N and y = Y
1− c+  if x = N and y = N
The weakest-link public goods game (Example 6) has the monoid R∞+ = ({R+ ∪
{∞},min,∞), f the embedding R+ ↪→ R∞+ , and g : R+ × R∞+ → R is g(x, y) =
min(x, y)− c(x).
3 Open games
Open games were introduced in [12] as a compositional approach to game theory.
I Definition 8 (Open game). Let X,Y,R, S,Σ be sets. An open game G : (XS )
Σ9 ( YR )
consists of:
(i) PG : Σ×X → Y , called play function
(ii) CG : Σ×X ×R→ S, called coplay function
(iii) BG : X × (Y → R)→ P(Σ2), called best response function.
Roughly speaking, an open game is a process that (i) given a strategy and observation,
decides a move, and (ii) given an strategy, observation, and a utility, returns a coutility
to the environment. Coutility is not a concept of classical game theory, but it enables
compositionality by incorporating the fact that players reason about the future consequences
of their actions. Finally, (iii), the best response function, which, given a context for the
game returns a relation on the set of strategies. A strategy σ is related to another strategy
σ′ if the latter is a best response to the former.
An open game is thought of as a process that receives observations (X) ’from the past’, and
the utility (R) ’from the future’. Similarly, it outputs moves (Y ) covariantly and coutility
(S) contravariantly.
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GXS YR
Open games are morphisms in a symmetric monoidal category Game. Composition, shown
below left, is sequential play: H · G is thought of as H happening after G, observing the
moves of G and feeding back its coutility as G’s utility. The monoidal product of open games
represents two games played independently. The games are placed side by side with no
connections, as shown below right.
G HXS ZQ
R
Y
G1X1
S1
Y1
R1G2
X2
S2
Y2
R2
In order to formally define composition and monoidal product of games, it is useful to
rephrase the definition in terms of lenses [18]. The details are recalled in Appendix A.
I Definition 9 (The category Game). Game is the symmetric monoidal category that has
pairs of sets (XS ) as objects and (equivalence classes of) open games G : (XS )
Σ9 ( YR ) as
morphisms.
Classical games are scalars in Game, i.e. open games ( 11 )9 ( 11 ). The fix-points of the best
response functions of scalars in Game are the Nash equilibria of the classical game they
represent.
Next we define specific open games used in our compositional account of network games.
The first is the Utility Maximising Player, modelling typical players of classical game theory.
I Definition 10 (Utility Maximising Player). Let X and Y be sets and argmax : RY → P(Y )
take a function κ : Y → R to the subset of Y where κ is maximised. Define D to be:
D : (X1 ) Y
X
9 ( YR )
PD(f, x) = f(x)
CD(f, x, r) = ∗
BD(x, κ) = {(y, y′) ∈ Y X × Y X : y′(x) ∈ argmax(κ)}
maxX YR
The category of sets and functions Set embeds into Game in two ways. In our compositional
account of network games, these embeddings encode how neighbours influence each other’s
utilities.
I Definition 11. Let X,Y be sets and f : X → Y a function. Its covariant lifting is defined:
f∗ : (X1 )
19 ( Y1 )
Pf∗(∗, x) = f(x)
Cf∗(∗, x, ∗) = ∗
Bf∗(x, ∗) = {(∗, ∗)}
fX Y
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K
max
max
u1(G)
un(G)
...
...
...
Figure 1 Open game representing a network game N played on a multigraph G
Similarly, its contravariant lifting is the following:
f∗ : ( 1Y )
19 ( 1X )
Pf∗(∗, ∗) = ∗
Cf∗(∗, ∗, x) = f(x)
Bf∗(∗, x) = {(∗, ∗)}
f XY
To obtain the games of Examples 4, 5 and 6 as scalars in Game, the players are taken to be
utility-maximising players. The connectivity of the ambient multigraph G determines their
utility functions as contravariant liftings ui(G), while the context K sends back the choices
of all players:
K :
(
Xn
Xn×···×Xn
) 19 ( 11 )
CK(x) = (x, . . . , x).
The respective games are then obtained as the composition illustrated in Fig. 1. When the
network game N is a monoid network game, the corresponding class of open games is given
by a monoidal functor from Grph, defined in the next section, to Game. These details are
in Section 5.
4 Open graphs
Here we extend the compositional approach to graph theory of [7] from simple graphs to
undirected multigraphs, thereby identifying a “syntax” of network games as the arrows of a
prop1 Grph, generated from a monoidal signature and equations. We also provide a useful
characterisation of Grph that explains its arrows as “open graphs”. Differently from other
approaches [3, 9], Grph is uses adjacency matrices (Definition 2). Indeed, the presentation
includes generators
: 0→ 1, : 2→ 1, : 1→ 0, : 1→ 2 (BIALG)
and the equations of Fig. 2. The prop B generated by this data is isomorphic [14, 25] to the
prop of matrices with entries from N, with composition being matrix multiplication.
I Example 12. The following string diagram in B corresponds to the 3× 2 matrix
( 2 1
0 1
1 0
)
.
1 A prop [16, 14] is a symmetric strict monoidal category where the objects are N, and m⊗ n := m+ n.
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= =
= =
= =
= =
= =
Figure 2 Commutative bialgebra equations, yielding prop B.
= = =
Figure 3 Equations of ∪, which together with the equations of Fig. 2 yield prop BU.
To convert between the two, think of the matrix as recording the numbers of paths: indeed,
the (i, j)th entry in the matrix is the number of paths from the ith left port to the jth right
port.
Next, we add a “cup” generator denoted
: 2→ 0 (U)
with its equations given in Fig. 3. Let BU be the prop obtained from (BIALG) and (U),
quotiented by equations in Figs. 2 and 3. Just as B captures ordinary matrices, BU captures
adjacency matrices:
I Proposition 13. For n ∈ N, the hom-set [n, 0] of BU is in bijection with n× n adjacency
matrices.
I Example 14. The equivalence relation of adjacency matrices is captured by the equations
of Fig. 3. Consider two equivalent matrices A = ( 0 11 0 ) ∼ ( 0 20 0 ) = A′. Their corresponding
diagram in BU is obtained by constructing their diagram in B as in Example 12 and
“plugging” them in the following.
2
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The two diagrams obtained are equated by the axioms of BU.
A2 = = = = = A
′2
The prop BU can be given a straightforward combinatorial characterisation as the prop Adj.
I Definition 15 (Adj). A morphism α : m→ n in the prop Adj [7] is a pair (B, [A]), where
B ∈MatN(m,n) is a matrix, while [A], with A ∈MatN(m,m), is an adjacency matrix. The
components of Adj morphisms can be read off a “normal form” for BU arrows, as illustrated
below.
B
A
m n
Composition in Adj becomes intuitive when visualised with string diagrams.
(B, [A]) ◦ (B′, [A′]) = (BB′, [A+BA′BT ])
B
A
B′
A′
l
m
n =
B
A
B′
A′B BT
l n
I Proposition 16. BU is isomorphic to the prop Adj. J
The proof is similar to the case for Z2 shown in in [7]. An extension of BU with just one
additional generator and no additional equations yields the prop Grph of central interest
for us.
I Definition 17. The prop Grph is obtained by from the generators in (BIALG) and (U)
together with a generator : 0→ 1. The equations are those of Figs. 2 and 3.
As we shall see, arrows 0 → 0 in Grph are precisely finite undirected multigraphs taken
up-to isomorphism: the additional generator plays the role of a graph vertex.
I Example 18. For example, the first of the following represents a multigraph with two
vertices, connected by a single edge. The second one, two vertices connected by two edges.
The third one, is a multigraph with three vertices and two edges between them.
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While the arrows [0, 0] are (isomorphism classes of) multigraphs, general arrows can be
understood as open graphs but their description is a little bit more involved. Roughly
speaking, they are graphs together with interfaces, and data that specifies the connectivity of
the graph to its interfaces. We make this explicit below. Indeed, we shall see (Theorem 22)
that the prop A, defined below, is isomorphic to Grph – for this reason we use Grph string
diagrams to illustrate its structure.
I Definition 19 (The prop A). A morphism Γ: m→ n in the prop A is defined by
Γ = (k, [A] , B,C,D, [E]) (3)
where k ∈ N, A ∈MatN(m,m), B ∈MatN(m,n), C ∈MatN(m, k), D ∈MatN(k, n) and
E ∈MatN(k, k). Similarly to Adj (Definition 15), the components of (3) can be read off a
“normal form” for arrows of Grph, as visualised below right.
Tuples (3) are taken up to an equivalence re-
lation that captures the fact that the order of
the vertices is immaterial. Let Γ ∼ Γ′ iff they
are morphisms of the same type, Γ,Γ′ : m →
n with k vertices, and there is a permuta-
tion matrix P ∈ Mat(k, k) such that Γ′ =
(k, [A] , B, CPT , PD,
[
PEPT
]
). The justifica-
tion for this equivalence is the equality of the
following two string diagrams in Grph, below
(for the details, see Appendix B on page 19).
A
B
D
C
E
k
m n
A
B
D
C
E
k
m n =
P
A
B
D
C
E
k
m n
It is worthwhile to give some intuition for the components of (3). The idea is that an arrow
Γ specifies a multigraph G = (k, [E]), and:
B specifies connections between the two boundaries, bypassing G
C specifies the connections between the left boundary and G
D specifies the connections between G and the right boundary
A specifies the connections between the interfaces on the left boundary. This allows Γ to
introduce connections between the vertices of an “earlier” open graph ∆. See Example 20
below.
Defining composition in A is straightforward, given the above intuitions, but the details are
rather tedious: see Lemma 37 in Appendix B.
I Example 20. In a composite term ∆ ; Γ, the second component may introduce edges
between the vertices in the first component. The first diagram in Example 18 can be
decomposed as follows, where the second component connects the two vertices in the first
component.
E. Di Lavore, J. Hedges and P. Sobociński 11
7−→ (0, [( )] , ¡, ( ), ¡, [( )]) 7−→ (0, [0] , !, !, ( ), [( )])
7−→ (0, [02] , ( 11 ) , ( ), ¡, [( )]) 7−→ (0, [0] , ( 1 1 ), !, ¡, [( )])
7−→ (0, [( 0 10 0 )] , !, !, ( ), [( )]) 7−→ (1, [( )] , ¡, ¡, 1, [0])
Figure 4 Image of θ on the generators
; =
We write ! for matrices with no columns, ¡ for matrices with no rows and ( ) for the empty
matrix.
I Example 21. The following show the role of each component of A morphisms, when
isolated as the only non-trivial component. The leftmost open graph has only left-side ports.
It introduces a self loop and two additional connections. The second has only connections
between the left and right interfaces; the first left port is connected twice to the first right
right, the second port is disconnected, and the third left port is connected to the second
and third right ports. The third open graph has one vertex connected to the two left ports.
The fourth has three vertices connected to the right ports, following the specification in the
second. The rightmost (closed) multigraph has its two vertices connected according to the
specification of the leftmost vertex-less open graph.
(0, [A], !, !, ¡, [( )]) (0, [0], B, !, ¡, [( )]) (1, [0], !, C, !, [0]) (3, [( )], ¡, ¡, D, [0]) (2, [( )], ( ), ¡, !, [E])
A = ( 1 02 0 ) B =
( 2 0 0
0 0 0
0 1 1
)
C = ( 11 ) D =
( 2 0 0
0 0 0
0 1 1
)
E = ( 1 02 0 )
The main result in this section is the following.
I Theorem 22. There is an isomorphism of props θ : Grph→ A.
The remainder of this section builds a proof of the above, summarised in the diagram below.
BU
∼= (Proposition 16)

// Grph ∼= BU+
{ }
θ

{ }
oo
∼= (Lemma 24)

Adj // A ∼= Adj+ bP (Proposition 25) bPoo
First, note that Grph is the coproduct BU+
{ }
in the category of props, where
{ }
is the free prop on a single generator 0→ 1. Next, we characterise
{ }
as bP, defined
below, in Lemma 24. Given that BU ∼= Adj, as shown in Proposition 16, to show the
existence of θ it suffices to show that A satisfies the universal property of the coproduct
Adj + bP, which we do in Proposition 25. The action of θ on the generators of Grph is
shown in Fig. 4.
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I Definition 23 (bP). The prop of bound permutations bP has as morphisms m→ m+ k
pairs [(k, P )] where k ∈ N and P ∈ MatN(m + k,m + k) is a permutation matrix. Such
pairs are identified to ensure that the order of the lower k rows of P is immaterial. Roughly
speaking, considering P as a permutation of m+k inputs to m+k outputs, in [(k, P )] the final
k inputs are “bound”. Explicitly, (k, P ) ∼ (k, P ′) iff there is a permutation σ ∈MatN(k, k)
st P =
(
1m 0
0 σ
)
P ′. Composition is defined:
(l, Q) ◦ (k, P ) = (k + l, ( P 00 1l )Q) P Q
m
k
l
m
k
l
Identities are identity matrices idn = (0,1n). The fact that bP is a prop is Lemma 38 in
Appendix B.
I Lemma 24. bP is isomorphic to
{ }
.
Proof. Let us call φ = (0, (1)) : 0→ 1, which is a morphism in bP. We show directly that, for
any other prop P that contains a morphism v : 0→ 1, there is a unique prop homomorphism
α# : bP→ P such that α#(φ) = v. The details are given as Lemma 39 in Appendix B. J
Given the results of Proposition 16 and Lemma 24, we obtain the isomorphism θ : Grph→ A,
thereby completing the proof of Theorem 22, by showing that:
I Proposition 25. A satisfies the universal property of the coproduct Adj+ bP.
Proof. In order to show that A is a coproduct Adj+ bP, we define the two inclusions.
i1 : Adj −→ A
n 7−→ n
(B, [A]) 7−→ (0, [A] , B, !, ¡, [( )])
B
A
7−→ B
A
i2 : bP −→ A
n 7−→ n
(k, P ) 7−→ (k, [0n] , P [1,n]∗ ,0nk, P [n+1,n+k]∗ , [0k])
P
m
k
m
k
7−→ Pkm m
k
We indicate with P [1,n]∗ the first n rows of the matrix P and, similarly, with P [n+1,n+k]∗ the
rows between the n+ 1-th and the n+ k-th. It is not difficult to show that these are indeed
homomorphism, the details are given as Claim 40 in Appendix B.
Now, we show that, for any other prop C with prop homomorphisms Adj f1−→ C f2←− bP,
there exists a unique prop homomorphism H : A → C such that H ◦ i1 = f1 and H ◦ i2 = f2.
Define the map:
H : A −→ C
n 7−→ n
(k, [A] , B,C,D, [E]) 7−→ f1 (( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]) ◦ (1m ⊗ f2(k, 1k))
We verify that H is a homomorphism in Lemma 41 in Appendix B. Next, we confirm that
H ◦ i1 = f1 and H ◦ i2 = f2:
H ◦ i1(B, [A]) = H(0, [A] , B, !, ¡, [( )])
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= f1(B, [A]) ◦ (1m ⊗ f2(0,10))
 B
A
f1
f2
 = f1(B, [A])
 B
A
f1

H ◦ i2(k, P ) = H(k, [0n] , P [1,n]∗ ,0nk, P [n+1,n+k]∗ , [0k])
= f1(P, [0n+k])◦(1n⊗f2(k,1k))
 Pkf1
f2
m
n
 = P◦f2(k, 1n+k)
 Pk
f2
m
n

= f2(k, P )
 Pk
f2
m
n

Moreover, H is the unique prop homomorphism with these properties. In fact, suppose there
is H ′ : A → C such that H ′ ◦ i1 = f1 and H ′ ◦ i2 = f2. Then:
H ′(k, [A] , B,C,D, [E]) =H ′(i1(( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]) ◦ (1m ⊗ i2(k, 1k)))
=H ′i1(( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]) ◦ (H ′(1m)⊗H ′i2(k, 1k))
=f1(( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]) ◦ (1m ⊗ f2(k, 1k))
=H(k, [A] , B, C,D, [E]).
J
5 Games on graphs via functorial semantics
Here we show that monoid network games N define monoidal functors FN : Grph→ Game,
which is our main contribution. To every open graph Γ, FN associates an open game, where
N is played on Γ. We give an explicit account of the FN -image of open graphs Γ, using the
characterisation of Theorem 22. We also explain how FN acts on closed graphs, which gives
classical games.
Fix a monoid network game N = (X,M, f, g) (Definition 7). Since Grph is presented by
generators and equations, it suffices to define FN on the generators and prove that it respects
the equations.
On objects, FN (1) = (MM ). Thus, for n ∈ Grph, we have FN (n) =
(
Mn
Mn
)
The vertex : 0→ 1 is mapped to the open game FN ( ) : ( 11 ) X9 (MM ) defined
by
ΣFN ( ) = X
PFN ( )(xi, ∗) = f(xi)
CFN ( )(xi, ∗,m) = ∗
(xi, x′i) ∈ BFN ( )(∗, κ :
M → M) iff x′i ∈
arg maxx′′
i
:X g(x′′i , κ(f(x′′i )))
max
f
g
M
M
X
X
R
The generators (BIALG) are mapped to the bialgebra structure on (M,M) induced by
the monoid action of M . Specifically, they are:
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FN ( ) : (MM )
19
(
M2
M2
)
{
P(∗,m) = (m,m)
C(∗,m1,m2,m3) = m2 ⊕m3
M
M
M
M
M
M
⊕
FN ( ) : (MM )
19 ( 11 ){
P(∗,m) = ∗
C(∗,m, ∗) = e
M
M e
FN ( ) : (MM )
19
(
M2
M2
)
{
P(∗,m1,m2) = m1 ⊕m2
C(∗,m1,m2,m3) = (m1,m1) M
M
M
M
M
M ⊕ FN ( ) : ( 11 )
19 (MM ){
P(∗, ∗) = e
C(∗, ∗,m) = ∗
M
M
e
where each of these open games is built from lifted functions (Definition 11).
: 2→ 0 is mapped to the following open game (see [12])
FN ( ) :
(
M2
M2
)
19 ( 11 ){
P(∗,m1,m2) = ∗
C(∗,m1,m2, ∗) = (m2,m1)
M
M
M
M
To prove that FN is a symmetric monoidal functor it suffices to show that the equations of
Grph are respected; this is a straightforward but somewhat lengthy computation.
I Theorem 26. FN defines a symmetric monoidal functor Grph→ Game.
Proof. See Appendix C, on page 29. J
Note that FN does not respect the axioms of (C1) or (C2) of [7], so it does not define a
functor ABUV→ Game in the terminology of that paper. This, together with the increased
expressivity of multigraphs over simple graphs, motivates our extension from ABUV to
Grph.
Using Theorem 22, we have a convenient “normal form” for the arrows of Grph and can
therefore give an explicit description of the image of any (open) graph Γ under FN . First, we
specialise to closed graphs because these result in ordinary network games. This result—a
sanity check for our compositional framework—is a corollary of the more general Theorem
28, proved subsequently.
I Corollary 27. Let N = (X,M, f, g) be a monoid network game, and consider Γ : 0→ 0 in
Grph, an undirected multigraph with k vertices. Then the open game FN (Γ) : ( 11 )
Xk9 ( 11 )
has:
ΣFN (Γ) = Xk as its strategy profiles,
BFN (Γ)(∗, ∗) ⊆ Xk ×Xk is the best response relation of N played on Γ.
Note that while the expressions in the statement of Theorem 28 below may seem involved,
they are actually derived in an entirely principled manner from the generators of Grph,
given our compositional framework. Indeed, the proof is by structural induction on the
morphisms of Grph.
I Theorem 28. Let N = (X,M, f, g) be a monoid network game. Let Γ : i → j be a
morphism in Grph with k vertices st θ(Γ) = (k, [A] , B,C,D, [E]), where A : i× i, B : i× j,
C : i × k, D : k × j and E : k × k. Then the open game FN (Γ) :
(
Mi
Mi
)
Xk9
(
Mj
Mj
)
is as
follows:
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The set of strategy profiles is Σ(FN (Γ)) = Xk
The play function PFN (Γ) : Xk ×M i →M j is given by PFN (Γ)(σ, x) = BTx⊕DT f(σ)
The coplay function CFN (Γ) : Xk ×M i ×M j → M i is CFN (Γ)(σ, x, r) = (A + AT )x ⊕
Br ⊕ Cf(σ)
The best response relation BFN (Γ) : M i × (M j →M j)→ P(Xk ×Xk) is given by
(σ, σ′) ∈ BFN (Γ)(x, κ) iff, for all k,
σ′k ∈ argmax
s∈X
g
(
s, (CT )k∗x⊕Dk∗κ
(
BTx⊕DT f(σ [k 7→ s]))⊕ (E + ET )k∗f(σ [k 7→ s]))
Proof. See Appendix C on page 31. J
6 Examples
We return to our motivating examples: the majority (Example 4), the best-shot public
goods (Example 5) and the weakest-link public goods (Example 6) games, and demonstrate
various applications of our framework. We first show that computing the Nash equilibrium
of the majority game played on interconnected cliques reduces to calculating equilibria of its
clique subgames.
I Example 29 (Majority game). In the majority game the best response can be decomposed
into the best responses of its components. Let N be the monoid network game that models
the majority game, defined on page 5, and consider a graph composed of N cliques, connected
as follows:
each vertex of each clique can be connected to at most one vertex of another clique,
in each clique there is at least one vertex not connected to any vertex outside its clique.
Such graphs decompose as N open graphs, each a clique with some vertices connected to
its boundary. We omit the details and give, instead, an illustrative example: below left is
a picture of three connected cliques, while the schematic string diagram on the right is a
corresponding expression in Grph.
 Γ4
Γ3
Γ5
It is easy to show (Appendix D, Proposition 42) that the choice of each clique does not
depend on the choices of other cliques. Indeed, the Nash equilibria of the majority game
played on connected cliques in our sense are those strategy profiles where, in every clique, all
players make the same choice. In particular, there are 2N Nash equilibria.
In some cases, players can take into account the choice
of another player with a different intensity. This can be
modelled by changing the number of edges between the
vertices. Let us consider the above example with some of the
vertices connected multiple times. This modification of the
network—illustrated on the right—reflects in a modification
of the equilibria, which are now strategy profiles in which
every player takes the same choice.
In the best-shot public goods game (Example 5), the Nash equilibrium is when no player
invests. In Example 30, we modify this game by allowing one player to interact with the
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environment. This modification “opens” the game to one of type ( 11 ) → (XR ): as a result,
the Nash equilibrium changes.
I Example 30 (Best-shot public goods game). Consider the best-shot public goods game
played on a graph that contains a vertex connected to all other vertices. Removing the
central vertex from this graph leaves an open graph that we will call Γ.
p S FN (Γ)
Mk
⊕
Mk
X
R
M
M
Here, FN (Γ) is the best-shot public goods game played on the open graph Γ, p is the central
player that have been substituted, and S is the external open game that influences p. The
utility function of player p and the coplay function of S are as follows.
up(Γ, x) =

1− c+ δ if xc = 1
1−  if xc = 0 ∧ ∃(c, j) ∈ EΓ xj = 1
1− c if ∀j xj = 0
S : (XR )
19 ( 11 )
C(∗, x, ∗) =
{
δ if x = 1
− if x = 0
The addition of the open game S and the modification of player p modifies the Nash equilib-
rium to be the strategy profile where the central player invests and no other player does. The
idea is that the “external” agent S incentivises the central player p to invest. The details are
in Appendix D.
Our last example illustrates a common situation where the compositional description of
a game does not allow a compositional analysis of the best response. However, in this
case, compositionality can be used to give a variant of the weakest-link public goods game
(Example 6) where different cost functions are used in different parts of the ambient graph
G. The desired game is obtained by composing the resulting open games according to the
structure of G.
I Example 31 (Weakest-link public goods game). Consider the weakest-link public goods
game played on a connected graph G. Suppose that players have different cost functions.
We partition them according to their cost functions, and use this partition to decompose the
G into an expression in Grph, as illustrated for a particular example below:
 Γ1
Γ2
Γ3
While the definition above uses our compositional techniques, the Nash equilibrium (Ap-
pendix D, Propositions 46 and 47) is calculated on the resulting closed game, and is a strategy
profile where every player invests equally, with utility depending on individual cost functions.
7 Conclusions
Our contribution is a compositional account of network games via strict monoidal functors.
This adds a class of network games to the games that have been expressed in compositional
game theory [12, 2]. Of independent interest is our work on the category Grph, extending [7].
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This is an approach to “open graphs” that, as we have seen, is compatible with the structure
of open games, and in future work we will identify other uses of this category.
We also intend to extend the class of open graphs to directed open graphs. The motivation
for this is that, in some network games, interactions between players are not bidirectional.
Consider, for example, a variant of the majority game where there is an “influencer”: a player
whose choice affects the choices of other players, but is not in turn conversely affected.
We will also extend the menagerie of games that can be played on a graph. We plan to
study games with more generic utility functions, incomplete information, and repeated games.
It could also prove interesting to study natural transformations between the functors that
define games, and explore the game theoretical relevance of such transformations.
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A Definitions for Section 3
For the formal definition of an open game, it is convenient to use the notion of lens [18]. (For
other references to how lenses are used in functional programming see [19] or [20, 8].)
I Definition 32 (Lens). Given sets X,S, Y,R, a lens λ : (XS )→ ( YR ) is given by two functions
vλ : X → Y called the view function
uλ : X ×R→ S called the update function
Lens composition of λ : (XS ) → ( YR ) and µ : ( YR ) →
(
Z
Q
)
is given by vµ◦λ = vµ ◦ vλ and
uµ◦λ(x, q) = uλ(x, uµ(vλ(x), q)). Lenses form a symmetric monoidal category, with the
monoidal product that is given on objects by
(
X1
S1
)⊗ (X2S2) = (X1×X2S1×S2 ).
I Definition 33 (Open game). Let X,Y,R, S,Σ be sets. An open game G : (XS )
Σ9 ( YR ) is:
A family of lenses λσ : (XS )→ ( YR ) indexed by σ ∈ Σ
BG : H(G)× K(G)→ P(Σ2), called the best response function, where
H(G) = Lens [( 11 ) , (XS )] ∼= X, K(G) = Lens [( YR ) , ( 11 )] ∼= Y → R
are called, respectively, the history and continuation of G. The pair (H(G),K(G)) is called
the context of G.
Spelling out this definition, the game G is given by three functions.
PG : Σ×X → Y , called play function
CG : Σ×X ×R→ S, called coplay function
BG : X × (Y → R)→ P(Σ2), called best response function
E. Di Lavore, J. Hedges and P. Sobociński 19
In order to be able to express a network game compositionally, we need the definitions of
composition and monoidal product of open games.
I Definition 34 (Sequential composition of open games). Let G : (XS )
ΣG9 ( YR ) and
H : ( YR )
ΣH9
(
Z
Q
)
be open games. Their sequential composition
H · G : (XS )
ΣG×ΣH9
(
Z
Q
)
is given by the parametric lens (H · G)(σ,τ) = Hτ ◦ Gσ indexed by (σ, τ) ∈ ΣG × ΣH. Let
x ∈ H(H · G) and κ ∈ K(H · G). The best response function of H · G is defined as follows.
BH·G(x, κ) = {(σ, τ, σ′, τ ′) ∈ (ΣG × ΣH)2 : (σ, σ′) ∈ BG(x, κ ◦ Hτ ) ∧ (τ, τ ′) ∈ BH(Gσ ◦ x, κ)}
I Definition 35 (Parallel composition of open games). Let G1 :
(
X1
S1
) Σ19 ( Y1R1 ) and
G2 :
(
X2
S2
) Σ29 ( Y2R2 ) be open games. Their parallel composition
G1 ⊗ G2 :
(
X1×X2
S1×S2
) Σ1×Σ29 ( Y1×Y2R1×R2 )
is given by the parametric lens (G1⊗G2)(σ1,σ2) = (G1)σ1⊗(G2)σ2 indexed by (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1×Σ2.
Let (x1, x2) ∈ H(G1 ⊗ G2) and κ ∈ K(G1 ⊗ G2). The best response function of G1 ⊗ G2 is
defined as follows.
BG1⊗G2(x1 ⊗ x2, κ) ={(σ1, σ2, σ′1, σ′2) ∈ (Σ1 × Σ2)2 :
(σ1, σ′1) ∈ BG1(x1, κ ◦Π1(G2, σ2, x2))∧
(σ2, σ′2) ∈ BG2(x2, κ ◦Π2(G1, σ1, x1))}
where Π1 and Π2 are the lenses
Π1(G2, σ2, x2) :
(
Y1
R1
)→ ( Y1×Y2R1×R2 ) Π2(G1, σ1, x1) : ( Y2R2 )→ ( Y1×Y2R1×R2 ){
vΠ1(y) = (y,PG2(σ2, x2))
uΠ1 = piR1
{
vΠ2(y) = (PG1(σ1, x1), y)
uΠ2 = piR2
Composition of open games is not associative on the nose for the simple reason that Σ1 ×
(Σ2 × Σ3) 6= (Σ1 × Σ2)× Σ3. It is needed to quotient by the following equivalence relation.
I Definition 36 (Equivalence classes of open games). Two open games G : (XS )
Σ9 ( YR ) and
G′ : (XS )
Σ′9 ( YR ) are equivalent if there is a bijection s : Σ→ Σ′ such that, for all σ, ρ ∈ Σ,
x ∈ X, r ∈ R and κ : Y → R,
PG(σ, x) = PG′(s(σ), x)
CG(σ, x, r) = CG′(s(σ), x, r)
(σ, ρ) ∈ BG(x, κ)⇔ (s(σ), s(ρ)) ∈ BG′(x, κ)
At this point, it is possible to define the category whose morphisms are open games [12].
B Proofs for Section 4
Details for definition 19. By naturality of the symmetries, the vertex generators commute
with any permutation matrix P .
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k
P =
k
Thus, we can show that Γ = (k, [A] , B, C,D, [E]) and Γ′ = (k, [A] , B,CPT , PD,
[
PEPT
]
)
represent the same open graph.
A
B
D
C
E
k
m n =
P
A
B
D
C
E
k
m n =
A
B
D
C
E
k
P
PT
P PT
m n
J
I Lemma 37. A is a prop.
Proof. We start by proving that A is a category. Composition is defined as follows because
the diagram on the left, which is the graphical composition of the two morphisms, can be
rewritten, using the axioms of B, as the diagram on the right, which represents the definition
of composition given as a formula.
Γ′◦Γ =
(
k + k′,
[
A+BA′BT
]
, BB′,
(
C +B(A′ +A′T )DT |BC ′) , (DB′
D′
)
,
[(
E+DA′DT DC′
0 E′
)])
A
B
D
C
E
k
m
A′
B′
D′
C ′
E′
k′
n p =
⊗
⊗
⊗
⊗
A
B
B
B
B
C
D
D
D
D
E
A′
A′
A′
B′
B′
C ′
C ′
D′
E′
k
k′
m p
Identities are defined in the obvious way.
1n = (0, [0n] ,1n, !, ¡, [( )])
We need to check that the definition of composition is coherent with the equivalence
classes. Let Γ = (k, [A] , B, C,D, [E]) ∼ (k, [A] , B,CPT , PD, [PEPT ]) = Γ0 and Γ′ =
(k′, [A′] , B′, C ′, D′, [E′]) ∼ (k′, [A′] , B′, C ′P ′T , P ′D′, [P ′E′P ′T ]) = Γ′0.
Γ′0 ◦ Γ0
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= (k + k′,
[
A+BA′BT
]
, BB′, (CPT +B(A′ +A′T )DTPT |BC ′P ′T ),(
PDB′
P ′D′
)
,
[(
PEPT+PDA′DTPT PDC′P ′T
0 P ′E′P ′T
)]
)
∼Γ′ ◦ Γ
with permutation matrix
(
P 0
0 P ′
)
.
Composition is associative because the matrices relative to the vertices are [ ]-equivalent.
Γ′′ ◦ (Γ′ ◦ Γ)
= (k + k′ + k′′,
[
A+B(A′ +B′A′′B′T )BT
]
, BB′B′′,(
C +B(A′ +A′T +B′(A′′ +A′′T )B′T )DT |B(C ′ +B′(A′′ +A′′T )D′T |B(B′C ′′)) ,(
DB′B′′
D′B′′
D′′
)
,
[(
E+D(A′+B′A′′B′T )DT D(C′+B′A′′D′T ) D(B′C′′)
D′A′′B′TDT E′+D′A′′D′T D′C′′
0 0 E′′
)]
)
= (k + k′ + k′′,
[
A+B(A′ +B′A′′B′T )BT
]
, BB′B′′,(
C +B(A′ +A′T +B′(A′′ +A′′T )B′T )DT |B(C ′ +B′(A′′ +A′′T )D′T |B(B′C ′′)) ,(
DB′B′′
D′B′′
D′′
)
,
[(
E+D(A′+B′A′′B′T )DT D(C′+B′(A′′+A′′T )D′T ) D(B′C′′)
0 E′+D′A′′D′T D′C′′
0 0 E′′
)]
)
=(Γ′′ ◦ Γ′) ◦ Γ
Clearly, composition is unital and we proved that A is a category. Now we prove that it is
monoidal.
Lead by the interpretation of the matrices that define a morphism, we define monoidal
product as follows.
Γ⊗ Γ′ = (k + k′, [(A 00 A′ )] , (B 00 B′ ) , (C 00 C′ ) , (D 00 D′ ) , [(E 00 E′ )])
The monoidal unit is the empty diagram.
I = (0, [( )] , ( ), ( ), ( ), [( )])
We verify that monoidal product is well-defined on equivalence classes. Let
Γ = (k, [A] , B, C,D, [E]) ∼(k, [A] , B,CPT , PD, [PEPT ]) = Γ0
Γ′ = (k′, [A′] , B′, C ′, D′, [E′]) ∼(k′, [A′] , B′, C ′P ′T , P ′D′, [P ′E′P ′T ]) = Γ′0
Then,
Γ0 ⊗ Γ′0
=
(
k + k′,
[(
A 0
0 A′
)]
,
(
B 0
0 B′
)
,
(
CPT 0
0 C′P ′T
)
,
(
PD 0
0 P ′D′
)
,
[(
PEPT 0
0 P ′E′P ′T
)])
∼ Γ⊗ Γ′
with permutation matrix
(
P 0
0 P ′
)
, which is the monoidal product of P and P ′.
Clearly, monoidal product is strictly associative and unital. Therefore, the pentagon and the
triangle equations [17] hold trivially. We are left to check that the monoidal product is a
functor.
(Γ0 ◦ Γ)⊗ (Γ′0 ◦ Γ0)
= (k + k0 + k′ + k′0,
[(
A+BA0AT 0
0 A′+B′A′0A
′T
)]
,
(
BB0 0
0 B′B′0
)
,(
C+B(A0+AT0 )D
T BC0 0 0
0 0 C′+B′(A′0+A
′T
0 )D
′T B′C′0
)
,
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(
DB0 0
D0 0
0 D′B′0
0 D′0
)
,
E+DA0DT DC0 0 00 E0 0 0
0 0 E′+D′A′0D
′T D′C′0
0 0 0 E′0
)
∼ (k + k′ + k0 + k′0,
[(
A+BA0AT 0
0 A′+B′A′0A
′T
)]
,
(
BB0 0
0 B′B′0
)
,(
C+B(A0+AT0 )D
T 0 BC0 0
0 C′+B′(A′0+A
′T
0 )D
′T 0 B′C′0
)
,(
DB0 0
0 D′B′0
D0 0
0 D′0
)
,
E+DA0DT 0 DC0 00 E′+D′A′0D′T 0 D′C′0
0 0 E0 0
0 0 0 E′0
)
=(Γ0 ⊗ Γ′0) ◦ (Γ⊗ Γ′)
with permutation matrix P =
(
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
)
.
Thus, A is a monoidal category. Finally, we prove that it is symmetric. Let σm,n indicate
the symmetry and let it be defined as follows.
σm,n = (0, [0] ,
(
0 1m
1n 0
)
, !, ¡, [( )])
Clearly, the symmetry is its own inverse: σm,n ◦ σn,m = 1m+n.
Moreover, σ is natural.
σn,n′ ◦ (Γ⊗ Γ′) =(k + k′,
[(
A 0
0 A′
)]
,
(
0 B
B′ 0
)
,
(
C 0
0 C′
)
,
(
0 D
D′ 0
)
,
[(
E 0
0 E′
)]
)
∼(k + k′, [(A 00 A′ )] , ( 0 BB′ 0 ) , ( 0 CC′ 0 ) , (D′ 00 D ) , [(E′ 00 E )])
=(Γ′ ⊗ Γ) ◦ σm,m′
with permutation matrix P = ( 0 11 0 ).
Lastly, the symmetry satisfies the hexagon equations.
(1n ⊗ σp,m) ◦ σm,n+p =(0, [0] ,
(
0 0 1m
1n 0 0
0 1p 0
)(
1n 0 0
0 0 1p
0 1m 0
)
, !, ¡, [( )])
=(0, [0] ,
(
0 1m 0
1n 0 0
0 0 1p
)
, !, ¡, [( )])
=σm,n ⊗ 1p
(σp,m ⊗ 1n) ◦ σm+n,p =(0, [0] ,
(
0 1m 0
0 0 1n
1p 0 0
)(
0 1p 0
1m 0 0
0 0 1n
)
, !, ¡, [( )])
=(0, [0] ,
(
1m 0 0
0 0 1n
0 1p 0
)
, !, ¡, [( )])
=1m ⊗ σn,p
Thus, A is a symmetric monoidal category whose objects are natural numbers. In other
words, it is a prop. J
I Lemma 38. bP is a prop.
Proof. The proof proceeds exactly as the previous one. We will use diagrammatic calculus
of Mat for the permutation matrix of the morphisms in order to make the proofs more
readable. We start by proving that bP is a category. Composition is well-defined on
equivalence classes by the monoidal structure of Mat. Let (k, P ) ∼ (k, ( 1m 00 σ )P ) = (k, P ′)
and (l, Q) ∼ (l,
(
1m+k 0
0 ρ
)
Q) = (l, Q′).
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(l, Q′) ◦ (k, P ′)
P ′
Q′
m
k
l
m
k
l
=(k + l,
( ( 1m 0
0 σ
)
P 0
0 1l
)(
1m+k 0
0 ρ
)
Q) =
P
Qσ
ρ
m
k
l
m
k
l
=(k + l,
( 1m 0 0
0 σ 0
0 0 ρ
) (
P 0
0 1l
)
Q) =
P
Qσ
ρ
m
k
l
m
k
l
∼(l, Q) ◦ (k, P ) ∼
P
Q
m
k
l
m
k
l
with permutation matrix
( 1m 0 0
0 σ 0
0 0 ρ
)
. Composition is clearly associative because it is associative
in Mat.
((l, R) ◦ (k,Q)) ◦ (j, P )
=(j + k + l,
(
P 0
0 1k+l
) (
Q 0
0 1l
)
R)
=(j + k + l,
( (
P 0
0 1k
)
Q 0
0 1l
)
R)
=(l, R) ◦ ((k,Q) ◦ (j, P ))
P
Q
R
m
j
k
l
m
j
k
l
Composition is unital by unitality of the composition in Mat.
(k, P ) ◦ (0,1m) = (0 + k, 1m+kP ) = (k, P ) P
m
k
m
k
= P
m
k
m
k
(0,1m+k) ◦ (k, P ) = (k + 0, P1m+k) = (k, P ) P
m
k
m
k
= P
m
k
m
k
The monoidal product is defined with a symmetry on the left because we need to keep track
of which of the inputs are bound.
(k, P )⊗ (k′, P ′) = (k + k′,
(
1m 0 0 0
0 0 1m′ 0
0 1k 0 0
0 0 0 1k′
)(
P 0
0 P ′
)
)
P
P ′
m
m′
k
k′
m
k
m′
k′
The monoidal unit is the empty diagram.
I = (0, ( ))
Monoidal product is well-defined on equivalence classes by naturality of the symmetries in
Mat. Let (k, P ) ∼ (k, ( 1m 00 σ )P ) = (k, P ′) and (l, Q) ∼ (l, ( 1n 00 ρ )Q) = (l, Q′).
(k, P ′)⊗ (l, Q′)
P ′
Q′
m
n
k
l
m
k
n
l
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=(k + l,
(
1m 0 0 0
0 0 1n 0
0 1k 0 0
0 0 0 1l
)(( 1m 0
0 σ
)
P 0
0
( 1n 0
0 ρ
)
Q
)
) =
P
Q
σ
ρ
m
n
k
l
m
k
n
l
=(k + l,
( 1m 0 0 0
0 1n 0 0
0 0 σ 0
0 0 0 ρ
)( 1m 0 0 0
0 0 1n 0
0 1k 0 0
0 0 0 1l
)(
P 0
0 Q
)
) =
P
Q
σ
ρ
m
n
k
l
m
k
n
l
∼(k, P )⊗ (l, Q) ∼
P
Q
m
n
k
l
m
k
n
l
with permutation matrix
( 1m+n 0 0
0 σ 0
0 0 ρ
)
. Monoidal product is a functor because we can change
the order in which we enumerate the vertices and because symmetries are natural inMat. For
the calculations below, we indicate with C =
(
1m 0 0 0
0 0 1m′ 0
0 1k+l 0 0
0 0 0 1k′+l′
)((
P 0
0 1l
)
Q 0
0
(
P ′ 0
0 1l′
)
Q′
)
the matrix associated to ((l, Q) ◦ (k, P ))⊗ ((l′, Q′) ◦ (k′, P ′)).
((l, Q) ◦ (k, P ))⊗ ((l′, Q′) ◦ (k′, P ′))
=(k + l + k′ + l′, C)
P
Q
P ′
Q′
m
m′
k′
m
k
lk
l
l′
m′
k′
l′
∼(k + k′ + l + l′,
(
1m+m′+k 0 0 0
0 0 1k′ 0
0 1l 0 0
0 0 0 1l′
)
C) ∼
P
Q
P ′
Q′
m
m′
k
m
k
l
k′
l
l′
m′
k′
l′
=((l, Q)⊗ (l′, Q′)) ◦ ((k, P )⊗ (k′, P ′)) =
P
Q
P ′
Q′
m
m′
k
m
k
l
k′
l
l′
m′
k′
l′
Monoidal product is clearly unital. The symmetry is lifted from Mat.
σm,n = (0,
(
0 1m
1n 0
)
)
m
mn
n
The symmetry is its own inverse and it satisfies the hexagon equations because it does so in
Mat.
Therefore, bP is a prop.
J
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I Lemma 39. bP is isomorphic to the free prop on one generator 0→ 1.
Proof. Define
α# : bP −→ P
(k, P ) 7−→ P ◦ (1m ⊗
⊗
k
v)
P
m
k
m
k
7−→ Pk
m m
k
where P ∈ P is the product of the symmetries that form P in bP.
We prove that α# is well-defined on equivalence classes. Let (k, P ) ∼ (k, ( 1m 00 σ )P ) = (k, P ′).
α#(k, P ′) P ′m
k
m
k
α#
=
((
1m 0
0 σ
)
P
) ◦ (1m ⊗ vk) = P ′km m
k
=P ◦ (1m ⊗ σ) ◦ (1m ⊗ vk) = P
σ
k
m m
k
=P ◦ (1m ⊗ σ ◦ vk)
=P ◦ (1m ⊗ vk) = Pkm m
k
=α#(k, P ) = Pm
k
m
k
α#
We show graphically that α# is a prop homomorphism
α#(I) = = I
α#(1n) = n = 1n
α#(0, σ) = σ = σ
α#((l, Q) ◦ (k, P )) =
P
Q
k
l
m m
k
l
=
P
Q
k
l
m m
k
l
= α#(l, Q) ◦ α#(k, P )
α#((k, P )⊗ (k′, P ′)) =
P
P ′
k
k′
m
m′
m
k
m′
k′
=
P
P ′
k
k′
m
m′
m
k
m′
k′
= α#(k, P )⊗ α#(k′, P ′)
and, by its definition,
α#(φ) = v
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Moreover, α# is the unique morphism bP→ P with this property. In fact, suppose there is
β : bP→ P such that β(φ) = v. Then,
β(k, P ) =β((0, P ) ◦ ((0,1n)⊗ (k,1k))
=β(0, P ) ◦ (β(0,1n)⊗ β(k, 1k))
=P ◦ (1n ⊗
⊗
k
v)
=a#(k, P )
Then bP is isomorphic to the free prop over one generator 0→ 1. J
B Claim 40. The following are prop homomorphisms.
i1 : Adj −→ A
n 7−→ n
(B, [A]) 7−→ (0, [A] , B, !, ¡, [( )])
B
A
7−→ B
A
i2 : bP −→ A
n 7−→ n
(k, P ) 7−→ (k, [0n] , P [1,n]∗ ,0nk, P [n+1,n+k]∗ , [0k])
P
m
k
m
k
7−→ Pkm m
k
Proof. We prove graphically that they are prop homomorphisms.
i1(I) = = I
i1(1n) = n = 1n
i1(σ, [( )]) = σ = σ
i1((B′, [A′]) ◦ (B, [A])) = B
A
B′
A′
= i1(B′, [A′]) ◦ i1(B, [A])
i1((B, [A])⊗ (B′, [A′])) =
B
A
B′
A′
= i1(B, [A])⊗ i1(B′, [A′])
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i2(I) = = I
i2(1n) = n = 1n
i2(0, σ) = σ = σ
i2((l, Q) ◦ (k, P )) =
P
Q
k
l
m m
k
l
=
P
Q
k
l
m m
k
l
= i2(l, Q) ◦ i1(k, P )
i2((k, P )⊗ (k′, P ′)) =
P
P ′
k
k′
m
m′
m
k
m′
k′
=
P
P ′
k
k′
m
m′
m
k
m′
k′
= i2(k, P )⊗ i2(k′, P ′)
J
I Lemma 41. H, defined on page 12, is a prop homomorphism.
Proof. Recall the definition of H.
H : A −→ C
n 7−→ n
(k, [A] , B,C,D, [E]) 7−→ f1 (( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]) ◦ (1m ⊗ f2(k, 1k))
A
B
D
C
E
k
m n 7−→ wk
f1
f2
m
n
where we called w = (( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]), which is a morphism in Adj.
w
m
k
n = A
B
D
C
E
m n
k
We need to prove thatH is well-defined on equivalence classes. Let Γ = (k, [A] , B,C,D, [E]) ∼
(k, [A] , B,CPT , PD,
[
PEPT
]
) = Γ′.
H(Γ′) = f1
(
( BPD ) ,
[(
A CPT
0 PEPT
)])
◦ (1m ⊗ f2(k,1k)) w′k
f1
f2
m
n
=f1
(
(( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]) ◦
((
1m 0
0 P
)
, [0]
)) ◦ (1m ⊗ f2(k, 1k)) = wk
P
f1
f2
m
n
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=f1 (( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]) ◦ (1m ⊗ P ) ◦ (1m ⊗ f2(k,1k)) = wk
P
f1
f2
m
n
=f1 (( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]) ◦ (1m ⊗ P ◦ f2(k,1k)) = wk
P
f1
f2
m
n
=f1 (( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]) ◦ (1m ⊗ f2(k, 1k)) = H(Γ) = wk
f1
f2
m
n
We prove that H is a prop homomorphism. Clearly, H is identity on objects. Moreover, it
preserves composition, as it is shown by the diagrams.
H(Γ′) ◦H(Γ)
= f1
((
B′
D′
)
,
[(
A′ C′
0 E′
)]) ◦ (1n ⊗ f2(k′,1k′))
◦f1 (( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]) ◦ (1m ⊗ f2(k, 1k))
wk
f1
f2
m
w′k′
f1
f2
n
p
= f1
((
B′
D′
)
,
[(
A′ C′
0 E′
)]) ◦ (f1 (( BD ) , [(A C0 E )])⊗ 1k)
◦(1m ⊗ f2(k, 1k)⊗ f2(k′,1k′))
= wk
f1
f2
m
w′
k′
f1
f2
n
p
= f1
(((
B′
D′
)
,
[(
A′ C′
0 E′
)]) ◦ ((( BD ) , [(A C0 E )])⊗ 1k))
◦(1m ⊗ f2((k,1k)⊗ (k′,1k′)))
= f1
((
BB′
DB′
D′
)
,
[(
A+BA′BT C+BA′DT BC′
DA′BT E+DA′DT DC′
0 0 E′
)])
◦(1m ⊗ f2(k + k′,1k+k′))
= f1
((
BB′
DB′
D′
)
,
[(
A+BA′BT C+B(A′+A′T )DT BC′
0 E+DA′DT DC′
0 0 E′
)])
◦(1m ⊗ f2(k + k′,1k+k′))
= wk
f1
f2
m
w′
k′
n
p
=H(Γ′ ◦ Γ)
H preserves identities.
H(1n) = H(0, [0n] ,1n, !, ¡, [( )])
f1
f2
n
=f1(1n, [0n]) ◦ (1n ⊗ f2(0,10)) = 1n = n
H preserves monoidal product. This is also more clearly seen with the string diagrams.
H(Γ)⊗H(Γ′)
= (f1 (( BD ) , [(A C0 E )]) ◦ (1m ⊗ f2(k, 1k)))
⊗ (f1 (( B′D′ ) , [(A′ C′0 E′ )]) ◦ (1n ⊗ f2(k′,1k′)))
=
wk
f1
f2
m
n
w′k′
f1
f2
m′
n′
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=
(
f1 (( BD ) , [(A C0 E )])⊗ f1
((
B′
D′
)
,
[(
A′ C′
0 E′
)]))
◦ (1m ⊗ σm′,k ⊗ 1k′) ◦ (1m+m′ ⊗ f2(k,1k)⊗ f2(k′,1k′))
=
w
f1
m
n
w′
k
k′
f1
f2
f2
m′
n′
= f1(((( BD ) , [(A C0 E )])⊗
((
B′
D′
)
,
[(
A′ C′
0 E′
)])
)
◦
((
1m 0 0 0
0 0 1m′ 0
0 1k 0 0
0 0 0 1k′
)
, [0m+m′+k+k′ ]
)
)
◦ (1m+m′ ⊗ f2(k + k′,1k+k′))
=
w
f1
m
n
w′
k
k′
f2
m′
n′
= f1
((
B 0
0 B′
D 0
0 D′
)
,
[(
A 0 C 0
0 A′ 0 C′
0 0 E 0
0 0 0 E′
)])
◦ (1m+m′ ⊗ f2(k + k′,1k+k′))
=
wf1
m
n
w′
k
k′
f2
m′
n′
=H(Γ⊗ Γ′)
It is easy to show that H preserves monoidal unit.
H(I) = H(0, [( )] , ( ), ( ), ( ), [( )]) f1
f2
=f1(( ), [( )]) ◦ (10 ⊗ f2(0,10)) = I =
Finally, H preserves symmetries.
H(σm,n) = H(0, [0m+n] ,
(
0 1m
1n 0
)
, !, ¡, [( )])
=f1(
(
0 1m
1n 0
)
, [0m+n]) ◦ (1m+n ⊗ f2(0,10))
f1
f2
m
mn
n
=f1(σm,n) = σm,n =
m
mn
n
J
C Proofs for Sections 5
Proof of Theorem 26 . FN respects the equations ofGrph because both the tuples
(
, , ⊕ , e
)
and
(
, , ⊕ , e
)
satisfy the commutative bialgebra axioms in figure 2, and
they both interact as in figure 3 with the cup .
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We explain in detail that the functor FN preserves associativity of the black monoid, the
rest of the equations are written with the same convention. We write on the left-most and
right-most sides morphisms in Grph that, by associativity, they must be equal. In the centre,
we write the morphisms in Game to which they are mapped (indicated with 7→) by the
functor FN . These morphisms are equal in Game by associativity of the monoid operation
⊕ on M and coassociativity of copying. Thus, we can say that FN preserves associativity of
the black monoid.
7→
⊕
⊕
=
⊕
⊕
7 →
7→
e
⊕
= 7 →
7→
⊕
=
⊕
7 →
7→
⊕
e
=
e
e
7 →
and similarly for their transposed versions.
7→
⊕
⊕
=
⊕
⊕
⊕
⊕
7 →
7→
e
e
= 7 →
7→
⊕
=
⊕
7 →
7→
e
=
e
7 →
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7→ = 7 →
J
Proof of Corollary 27. Γ = (k, [( )] , ( ), ¡, !, [E]). Then, by Theorem 28,
(σ, σ′) ∈ BFN (Γ) ⇔∀k′ σ′k′ ∈ argmax
s∈X
g(s, (E + ET )k
′
∗ f(σ [k′ 7→ s]))
⇔∀k′ σ′k′ ∈ argmax
s∈X
g(s,
⊕
vjvk′∈EG
j 6=k′
f(σj)⊕
⊕
vk′vk′∈EG
f(s))
Thus, fix-points of BFN (Γ) are Nash equilibria for FN (Γ) and vice versa.
(σ∗, σ∗) ∈ BFN (Γ) ⇔∀k′ ∀s ∈ X g(σ∗,
⊕
vjvk′∈EΓ
f(σ∗j )) ≥ g(s,
⊕
vjvk′∈EΓ
j 6=k′
f(σj)⊕
⊕
vk′vk′∈EΓ
f(s))
⇔∀k′ ∀s ∈ X uk′(Γ, σ∗) ≥ uk′(Γ, σ∗ [k′ 7→ s])
⇔σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium for FN (Γ)
J
Proof of Theorem 28. The proof proceeds by structural induction on Γ.
It is straightforward to check from the definition of FN that the generators of Grph are sent
to open games of the required form.
We need to check that composition is of the form as in the statement. We compute explicitly
its play, coplay and best response functions.
PFN (Γ′◦Γ)((σ, σ′), x)
= PFN (Γ′)·FN (Γ)((σ, σ′), x)
= PFN (Γ′)(σ′, BTx⊕DT f(σ))
= B′TBTx⊕B′TDT f(σ)⊕D′T f(σ′)
= (BB′)Tx⊕ (DB′
D′
)T
f(
(
σ
σ′
)
)
CFN (Γ′◦Γ)((σ, σ′), x, q)
= CFN (Γ′)·FN (Γ)((σ, σ′), x, q)
= CFN (Γ)(σ, x,CFN (Γ′)(σ′,PFN (Γ)(σ, x), q))
= (A+AT )x⊕B((A′ +A′T )(BTx⊕DT f(σ))⊕B′q ⊕ C ′f(σ′))⊕ Cf(σ)
= ((A+BA′BT ) + (A+BA′BT )T )x⊕BB′q ⊕ (C +B(A′ +A′T )DT |BC ′)f(
(
σ
σ′
)
)
(ρ, ρ′) ∈ BFN (Γ′◦Γ)(x, κ)
⇔((σ, τ), (σ′, τ ′)) ∈ BFN (Γ′)◦FN (Γ)(x, κ)
⇔(σ, σ′) ∈ BFN (Γ)(x, κ ◦ FN (Γ′)τ ) ∧ (τ , τ ′) ∈ BFN (Γ′)(FN (Γ)σ ◦ x, κ)
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⇔∀k σ′k ∈ argmax
s∈X
g(s, (CT )k∗x⊕Dk∗CFN (Γ′)(τ ,BTx⊕DT f(σ [k 7→ s]),
κ(PFN (Γ′)(τ ,BTx⊕DT f(σ [k 7→ s]))))⊕ (E + ET )k∗f(σ [k 7→ s]))
∧ ∀k′ τ ′k′ ∈ argmax
s∈X
g(s, (C ′T )k
′
∗ PFN (Γ)(σ, x)⊕ (D′)k
′
∗ κ(B′TPFN (Γ)(σ, x)
⊕D′T f(τ [k′ 7→ s]))⊕ (E + E′T )k′∗ f(τ [k′ 7→ s]))
⇔∀k σ′k ∈ argmax
s∈X
g(s, (CT +D(A′ +A′T )BT )k∗x
⊕ (D(A′ +A′T )DT + E + ET )k∗f(σ [k 7→ s])
⊕ (DC ′)k∗f(τ)⊕ (DB′)k∗κ((BB′)Tx⊕ (DB′)T f(σ [k 7→ s])⊕D′T f(τ)))
∧ ∀k′ τ ′k′ ∈ argmax
s∈X
g(s, ((BC ′)T )k
′
∗ x⊕ (E′ + E′T )k
′
∗ f(τ [k′ 7→ s])
⊕ ((DC ′)T )k′∗ f(σ)⊕ (D′)k
′
∗ κ((BB′)Tx⊕ (DB′)T f(σ)⊕D′T f(τ [k′ 7→ s]))
⇔∀a = 1, ..., k + k′
s ∈ argmax
s∈X
g
(
s,
(
CT+D(A′+A′T )BT
C′TBT
)a
∗
x
⊕ (DB′
D′
)a
∗ κ((BB
′)Tx⊕ (B′TDT |D′T )f(ρ [a 7→ ρ′a]))
⊕
(
E+ET+D(A′+A′T )DT DC′
C′TDT E′+E′T
)a
∗
f(ρ [a 7→ ρ′a])
)
Similarly, we show that monoidal product has the desired form.
PFN (Γ⊗Γ′)((σ, σ′), (x, x′))
= PFN (Γ)⊗FN (Γ′)((σ, σ′), (x, x′))
= (BTx⊕DT f(σ), B′Tx′ ⊕D′T f(σ′))
=
(
B 0
0 B′
)T ( x
x′
)
⊕ (D 00 D′ )T f(( σσ′ ))
CFN (Γ⊗Γ′)((σ, σ′), (x, x′), (r, r′))
= CFN (Γ)⊗FN (Γ′)((σ, σ′), (x, x′), (r, r′))
= ((A+AT )x⊕Br ⊕ Cf(σ), (A′ +A′T )x′ ⊕B′r′ ⊕ C ′f(σ′))
=
((
A 0
0 A′
)
+
(
A 0
0 A′
)T)( x
x′
)
⊕ (B 00 B′ ) ( rr′ )⊕ (B 00 B′ ) f(( σσ′ ))
(ρ, ρ′) ∈ BFN (Γ′⊗Γ)((x, x′), 〈κ, κ′〉)
⇔((σ, τ), (σ′, τ ′)) ∈ BFN (Γ′)⊗FN (Γ)((x, x′), 〈κ, κ′〉)
⇔(σ, σ′) ∈ BFN (Γ)(x, κ(−,PFN (Γ′)(τ , x′))) ∧ (τ , τ ′) ∈ BFN (Γ′)(x′, κ′(PFN (Γ)(σ, x),−))
⇔∀k σ′k ∈ argmax
s∈X
g(s, (CT )k∗x⊕Dk∗κ(BTx⊕DT f(σ [k 7→ s]), B′Tx′ ⊕D′T f(τ))
⊕ (E + ET )k∗f(σ [k 7→ s]))
∧ ∀k′ τ ′k′ ∈ argmax
s∈X
g(s, (C ′T )k
′
∗ x
′ ⊕ (D′)k′∗ κ′(BTx⊕DT f(σ), B′Tx′ ⊕D′T f(τ [k′ 7→ s]))
⊕ (E′ + E′T )k′∗ f(τ [k′ 7→ s]))
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⇔∀a = ..., k + k′
ρ′a ∈ argmax
s∈X
g
(
s,
((
C 0
0 C′
)T)a
∗
(
x
x′
)
⊕
((
D 0
0 D′
)T)a
∗
〈κ, κ′〉((B 00 B′ )T ( xx′ )⊕ (D 00 D′ )T f(ρ [a 7→ s]))
⊕
((
E 0
0 E′
)
+
(
E 0
0 E′
)T)a
∗
f(ρ [a 7→ s])
)
J
D Proofs for Section 6
I Proposition 42. The fix-points of the best response function BFN (Γm)(x, κ) of FN (Γm) do
not depend on x and κ. In particular, the equilibria are given by every player in the clique
making the same choice.
Proof. The fix-points of BFN (Γm)(x, κ) are the Nash equilibria of the game FN (Γm) given
the context (x, κ). In this setting, the context represents the choices of the players that
can be connected to the boundaries of FN (Γm). Therefore, we will prove that the Nash
equilibria of this game do not depend on the choices of the players that can be connected to
the boundaries.
Let M be the number of vertices in the component Γm. Let fi (‘friends’ of player i) indicate
the number of neighbours of player i that take the same choice as player i, including a
possible neighbour connected at the boundary. Similarly, let ei (‘enemies’ of player i) indicate
the number of neighbours of player i that take the different choice from player i.
By hypothesis, there is a player in the clique Γm that has no edges connected to the boundaries.
Let k be this player. Then, all its neighbours are vertices of Γm and are neighbours of any
other vertex in Γm.
Suppose ek = 0. Then every player takes the same choice and gets utility 1, which is the
maximum value. Thus, no player has the incentive to deviate from its choice and this strategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose ek > 0 and let k′ be one of the ‘enemies’ of player k. Then, the ‘friends’ of k′ are
the ‘enemies’ of k minus player k′ plus one eventual connection of k′ to the boundaries
fk′ ≤ ek − 1 + 1 = ek
Similarly, since all the ‘friends’ of player k are neighbours of k′ as well, the ‘enemies’ of k′
are at least the ‘friends’ of k plus player k
ek′ ≥ fk + 1
If fk < ek, this strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium because player k would increase its
own utility from 0 to 1 by changing its choice.
Then, suppose that fk ≥ ek. By the inequalities above,
fk′ ≤ ek ≤ fk < fk + 1 ≤ ek′
Then, this strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium because player k′’s choice is not the
majority one and k′ would increase its own utility by changing its choice.
34 Games on graphs: a compositional approach
This means that the strategy profile with at least two players taking a different choice cannot
be an equilibrium.
Therefore, the only equilibria are that every player chooses Y or every player chooses N and
they do not depend on the inputs x and κ of the best response function BFN (Γm)(x, κ). J
I Example 43 (details of Example 30). We explain here the details of the definitions of the
components of this game.
p S FN (Γ)
Mk
⊕
Mk
X
R
M
M
Γ is the open graph obtained by removing the central vertex from the original graph and N
is the best-shot public goods game as in Example 2. Then, the game N played on the open
graph Γ is given by FN (Γ) and is represented by
FN (Γ)
Mk
Mk
The central player can be obtained by composing together a player like all the other ones
with an open game that represents the source of the incentive for this player. First, we
modify the player by copying its moves to the outside and allowing a direct external influence
on its utility.
max
f
g
M
M
X
X
R
 
max
M
M
X
R
⊕
f
g
X
XR
Then, we compose it with the source S of the incentive, which is given by the open game
S : (XR )
19 ( 11 )
C(∗, x, ∗) =
{
δ if x = 1
− if x = 0
and we obtain the open game.
p SX
R
M
M
By reconnecting this player with the rest of the network game we obtain the game showed in
Example 30. We can analyse it by computing the best responses of its components separately.
The following proposition computes the best response of FN (Γ).
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I Proposition 44. The best response of FN (Γ) does not depend on its input. In particular,
the fix-point of BFN (Γ)(∗, κ) is the strategy profile where no player invests, for every value of
κ.
Proof. We start by computing the best response function Bi(∗, κ) of a player and showing
that it is the same for every value of κ. With this information, we can prove the thesis.
By definition, (σi, σ′i) ∈ Bi(∗, κ) ⇔ σ′i ∈ argmaxs∈X g(s, κ(s)). Since κ : M → M , where
M = {Y,N}, it can assume four values 1, !Y , !N ,¬, which denote the identity, the constant
on Y , the constant on N and negation respectively. The maximum utilities that can be
achieved in these cases are 1− c+ , 1, 1− c+ , 1 respectively. All of these values are reached
with s = N .
Therefore, the only fix-point of Bi(∗, κ) can be (N,N) for any value of κ.
The best response of FN (Γ) is of the form BFN (Γ)(∗, κ) = B1(∗,∼)× ...× Bk(∗,∼), where ∼
indicates a generic argument that we do not need to compute because of what we showed
above. Thus, the fix-point of BFN (Γ)(∗, κ), for any value of κ, is the strategy profile where
no player invests. J
Now, we can compute the Nash equilibrium of the whole game.
I Proposition 45. The (unique) Nash equilibrium of the game described at the beginning is
that the central player invests and no other player does.
Proof. We compute the fix-point of the best response of the game by composing FN (Γ) with
the central player.
(σ, σ) ∈ BG ⇔(σ−p, σ−p) ∈ BFN (Γ)(∗, σp) ∧ (σp, σp) ∈ Bp(∗,
∨
σ−p)
⇔∀i 6= p σ′i = N ∧ σp ∈ argmax
s∈X
{g(s,N) + CS(s)}
⇔∀i 6= p σ′i = N ∧ σp = Y
where we used the result of Proposition 44. Thus, every fix-point of the global best response
relation is σ such that ∀i 6= p σi = N and σp = Y . J
I Proposition 46. Suppose there are i and j such that σi 6= σj. Then σ cannot be a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. The graph Γ is connected, then there is a path between the vertices i and j. If
σi 6= σj , then there are neighbouring vertices i′ and j′ on the path such that σi′ > σj′ .
Then,
ui′(Γ, σ) = min
l=i′∨i′l∈EΓ
σl − ci′(σi′) ≤ σj′ − ci′(σi′) < σj′ − ci′(σj′)
This means that player i′ can increase its own utility by choosing the investment level σj′ .
Thus, under the current hypothesis, σ cannot be a Nash equilibrium. J
I Proposition 47. Suppose every player chooses the same level of investment x∗. Then,
σ = (x∗, ..., x∗) is a Nash equilibrium iff for every player i and for every other x < x∗,
x− ci(x) < x∗ − ci(x∗).
Proof. The strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for every player i,
⇔x∗ ∈ argmax ui(Γ, (x, σ−i))
⇔x∗ ∈ argmax min{x, x∗} − ci(x)
⇔∀x < x∗ x− ci(x) < x∗ − ci(x∗)
J
